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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FIRST AMENDMENT AS LAST RESORT: THE INTERNET
GAMBLING INDUSTRY’S BID TO ADVERTISE IN THE UNITED
STATES

I. INTRODUCTION
Gambling is a business the Internet serves well. Web sites like
BETonSPORTS.com and PartyPoker.com provide almost unlimited access to
betting and gambling.1 These Web sites and many others like them are
operated from a variety of jurisdictions including Costa Rica, Britain, and
countries in the Caribbean.2 Although Internet gambling has existed for
approximately ten years, many countries continue to struggle to apply
traditional gaming laws to a medium whose jurisdictional issues challenge
enforceability.3
In the United States, gambling is mostly left to the states to regulate or
prohibit.4 However, some methods of gambling, such as placing a bet via
telephone, can involve interstate commerce if the bet is transmitted across state
lines.5 Congress has therefore enacted some federal gambling provisions.
Those laws, however, provide somewhat of an awkward fit to Internet
gambling.6 For example, the Wire Act—enacted to combat betting rings led
by organized crime—forbids transmission of a bet or wager across state lines.7
In a Fifth Circuit case, the Wire Act was interpreted as only applicable to
1. Online Gamblers Bet on Industry, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, at 12 (quoting the CEO of
BETonSPORTS.com, David Carruthers, as saying: “[T]here are millions of Americans wagering
every day.”); Peter Gumbel, How the U.S. Is Getting Beat in Online Gambling, TIME, Nov. 28,
2005, at A1 (special section). It is estimated that there are 12 million online gamblers worldwide,
and that 5.3 million of them are American. Susan Ormand, Pending U.S. Legislation to Prohibit
Offshore Internet Gambling May Proliferate Money Laundering, 10 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 447,
448 (2004). “Internet gambling” will hereinafter refer to both gambling and sports betting on the
Internet. “Operators” will refer to the people who operate gambling Web sites.
2. Matt Richtel, Gambling Sites Offering Ways to Let Any User Be the Bookie, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2004, at C1. Approximately seventy-five jurisdictions in the world allow operation of
Internet gambling Web sites. Sue Schneider, The Market—An Introduction, in INTERNET
GAMBLING REPORT 51 (Mark Balestra & Anthony Cabot eds., 7th ed. 2004).
3. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE ISSUES 6, 45 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id.
6. See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., GAMING LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 563 (2003).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
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sports betting.8 That decision leaves casino games, such as poker, blackjack,
and slots, which are popular on the Internet, in a gray area.9 Various bills have
been introduced in Congress to attempt to update federal gambling laws for the
Internet, but none has passed both houses.10
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), however, maintains that current
federal gambling law does apply to Internet gambling and in fact makes it
illegal.11 In a letter dated June 11, 2003, the DOJ informed the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) that “[w]ith very few exceptions limited to
licensed sportsbook operations in Nevada, state and federal laws prohibit the
operation of sportsbooks and Internet gambling within the United States,
Noting that
whether or not such operations are based offshore.”12
advertisements for Internet gambling are “ubiquitous on the Internet, in print
ads, and over the radio and television,” the DOJ asked the association to warn
its members that should they accept money from Internet gambling operators,
they would be aiding and abetting an illegal activity and would be punishable
as a principal violator under 18 U.S.C § 2.13 The DOJ noted that U.S.
attorneys general have successfully prosecuted Internet gambling operations
and “will continue to pursue such cases.”14
8. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480 (2001).
9. See Pat King, Legal Issues Still Unclear on ‘Net Gaming, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Oct.
22, 2001, at 3B.
10. Stevie Watson et al., The Legalization of Internet Gambling: A Consumer Protection
Perspective, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 209, 210 (2004). The Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act (IGPA) of 1997 was an effort to make Internet gambling illegal under the Wire
Act. Id. The bill was not passed, but it was reintroduced in 1999, when it passed the Senate but
not the House of Representatives. Id. In 2001, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act (UIGFPA) was introduced; this Act made it a crime for U.S. financial institutions
to do business with the Internet gambling industry. Id. This bill was passed in 2002 and 2003 by
the House, but did not get Senate support. Id. A companion bill to the UIGFPA, the Combating
Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act (CIGRMA), would amend the Wire Act to
make online gambling illegal. Thomas James Friedrich, Comment, Internet Casino Gambling:
The Nightmare of Lawmaking, Jurisdiction, Enforcement & the Dangers of Prohibition 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 369, 375 (2003). This bill passed the House Judiciary Committee in
2002, but was later “brought down by the conflicts of special interests.” Id. at 379–80.
11. Letter from John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to the National Ass’n of Broadcasters (June 11, 2003), available at
http://ww2.casinocitypress.com/ExhibitAtoComplaint.pdf [hereinafter NAB Letter]. The DOJ
stated that operators of betting and casino Web sites that accept U.S. customers violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 (the Wire Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act), and 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (the Organized
Crime Control Act). NAB Letter, supra.
12. NAB Letter, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Id. As of 1999, the DOJ had brought charges against twenty-two Internet gambling
operators for violation of the Wire Act. NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION,
FINAL REPORT 5-9 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf
[hereinafter NGISC REPORT]. Former Attorney General Janet Reno has said, “The Internet is not
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Subsequent to sending its advertising warning, the DOJ took steps to curb
Internet gambling advertising.15 Prosecutors have convened grand juries to
inquire about the broadcast of such advertising, and most major American
broadcasters and online media, including Clear Channel Communications,
Infinity Broadcasting, Discovery Networks, Yahoo!, and Google, have stopped
carrying the advertisements.16 This tactic is quite telling about the nature of
the Internet gambling industry.17 Safely situated offshore, operators may avoid
U.S. law while raking in billions of U.S. dollars per year.18 The popularity of
Internet gambling, especially sports betting and poker, continues to grow.19
The DOJ’s response seems to be that if it can’t prosecute operators directly, it
may go after those they do business with in the United States.20

an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting. To Internet betting operators everywhere, we have a
simple message: ‘You can’t hide online and you can’t hide offshore.’” Id. at 5-10 (citing
Benjamin Weiser, 14 Facing Charges in First U.S. Action on Internet Betting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1998, at A1. At least one of the operators charged, Jay Cohen, was convicted and sentenced to
twenty-one months in prison for his Internet gambling offense. Matt Richtel, An Industry That
Dares Not Meet in the Country of Its Best Customers, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at C4.
15. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Authorities Seize Advertising Funds for Overseas Online
Casinos, 20 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 353, 354 (Aug. 2004).
16. Id.; Matt Richtel, Lawsuit Claims Free Speech for Online Casino Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2004, at C3; see also Liz Benston, Online Casinos Continue Marketing Push, IN BUS. LAS
VEGAS, Dec. 17, 2004, at 15. On September 24, 2004, the former owner of three St. Louis sports
radio stations agreed to pay $159,000 to settle a criminal investigation by the U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of Missouri about the stations’ advertising of sportsbooks. Peter Shinkle,
KFNS Settles with Government over Betting Ads, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2004, at
19. Similarly, the Sporting News agreed to pay $7.2 million to settle federal claims regarding
advertisements for Internet gambling. Peter Shinkle, Sporting News Will Pay $7.2 Million over
Online Gambling Ads, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2006, at A6 [hereinafter Shinkle,
Sporting News].
17. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-10 (stating that the international nature of the online
gambling business assists its “ability to circumvent regulations”); Watson et al., supra note 10, at
210 (“[T]he borderless, global nature of the Internet makes enforcement problematic, especially
with providers in countries in which Internet gambling is legal.”).
18. Estimates of Internet gambling revenue vary. In 2004, Christiansen Capital Advisors
estimated that global Internet gambling revenue was $7.4 billion. Anthony Cabot, Traditional
Versus Internet Gambling, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 33, 44.
19. In 2001, estimated global revenues in U.S. dollars for Internet gambling were $3 billion;
in 2002, $4 billion; in 2003, $5.7 billion. Id. In 2005 the estimated revenue was $9.9 billion. Id.
This growth resembles consumers’ overall increased spending on “land-based” (non-Internet)
gambling. Between 1982 and 1996, consumer spending on legal gambling grew at an average
annual rate of 11.4 percent. Eugene Martin Christiansen, Gambling and the American Economy,
556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 36, 40 (1998). For the increased popularity of poker,
see Schneider, supra note 2, at 53.
20. Shinkle, Sporting News, supra note 16 (quoting Roland Corvington, FBI agent in charge
of the St. Louis District, as saying that enforcement of U.S. law against Internet gambling
operators is aimed at companies that support them).
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The Casino City Complaint

Thus, increasingly cut off from a major way to market to Americans, the
Internet gambling industry attempted to strike back with a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment against the DOJ on First Amendment grounds.21 The
complaint was filed on August 9, 2004, by Casino City, Inc., a United States
company, in U.S. District Court in the Middle District of Louisiana.22 Casino
City maintains a portal Web site at www.casinocity.com, which offers
information and news about both online and traditional land-based gambling.23
According to its complaint, Casino City “disseminates information . . . such as
interviews with professional gamblers, advice and expert columns, directories,
playing strategies and tips, weekly news publications and news clips.”24 In its
complaint, Casino City stated that the advertisements it accepts are neither
misleading nor concern unlawful activity.25 The complaint stated that Casino
City does not knowingly accept payment from proceeds of illegal gambling or
wagers placed by people located in the United States.26 According to the
complaint, the advertisements Casino City posts on its Web site are of the
same content that the DOJ warned may constitute an aiding and abetting
violation of various federal and state laws.27 Casino City cited the “numerous
subpoenas” issued by the DOJ to media outlets relating to Internet gambling
advertisements as well as the NAB letter as creating reasonable and imminent

21. Complaint at 2, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La.
Aug. 7, 2004), available at http://ww2.casinocitypress.com/ComplaintFiledon8-9-04.pdf
[hereinafter Complaint]. “Corfman [the CEO of Casino City] isn’t taking on Justice singlehanded.” Spencer E. Ante, High Stakes for Casino City, BUS. WK., Feb. 14, 2005, at 82, 82–83.
Online gambling companies, including Sportingbet PLC, and trade associations are helping pay
for the lawsuit. Id. at 82; see also Richtel, supra note 16 (quoting gambling attorney Lawrence
G. Walters as saying that this is a test case).
22. Complaint, supra note 21, at 1.
23. See Casino City, http://www.casinocity.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
24. Complaint, supra note 21, at 3.
25. Id. Under the test governing First Amendment protection for commercial speech, the
activity advertised must be legal and not misleading. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
26. Complaint, supra note 21, at 3.
Casino City does not conduct or participate in online casino or sports book activities.
Casino City does not knowingly accept, in payment for running online casino or sports
book advertisements, proceeds that come from illegal bets, deposits or wagers placed by
persons located in the United States or anywhere world-wide, and the company has taken
reasonable steps to ensure that such proceeds are not received.
Id.
27. Id. at 4.
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fear of prosecution “within the advertising community resulting in a chilling
effect upon the exercise of free speech.”28
B.

The DOJ Moves to Dismiss, and Casino City Responds

On October 29, 2004, the DOJ moved to dismiss Casino City’s
complaint.29 The DOJ’s reply brief addressed two major issues. The first issue
was standing, which will not be discussed in this Comment.30 The second
issue addressed by the DOJ concerned the First Amendment. If Casino City is
threatened with prosecution, the DOJ argued, it is because the conduct in
question—Internet gambling—is illegal.31 The DOJ stated: “Casino City’s
claim fails as a matter of law, for it is well-established that there is no First
Amendment right to advertise illegal activity.”32 The DOJ then argued that it
could satisfy the remaining prongs of the test for commercial free speech.33
Casino City’s response to the DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss called the DOJ’s
actions a “well orchestrated plan to unabashedly set out to stifle the free speech
of an entire sector of the advertising industry.”34 Casino City argued that it
was forced to engage in conduct that is “likely proscribed by the challenged
restriction as interpreted by the DOJ,” or censor itself.35 Casino City stressed
that its advertisements are available in every country, not just the United

28. Id. at 2–3. “On information and belief, as a direct result of the DOJ threats, a number of
internet advertising portals based in the United States have ceased to accept advertising of legal
casino and sports betting.” Id.
29. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3
(M.D. La. Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/MotionToDismiss.pdf
[hereinafter DOJ Motion to Dismiss].
30. Id. at 7. The DOJ argued that Casino City had no standing to bring this complaint. Id. at
7–9. The DOJ alleged a contradiction in the complaint—that Casino City stated both that its
advertisements are of the same type that violate U.S. law (as interpreted by the DOJ), and also
that the advertisements concerned legal activity. Id. at 16. If Casino City is engaged in legal
activity, the DOJ argued, it is in no danger of imminent prosecution. Id. On the other hand, if
Casino City is engaged in illegal activity, there would be no basis for it to assert First Amendment
protection, because only advertisements that contain speech about legal conduct are protected. Id.
at 17. Further, the DOJ argued that there is no imminent threat of prosecution because more than
one year has passed since the NAB Letter was sent, and Casino City received no correspondence
from the DOJ. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 17–18.
32. Id. at 17 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563–64 (1980)).
33. Id. at 19.
34. Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Nov. 18, 2004),
available
at
http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/MemoinResponsetoMotiontoDismiss.pdf
[hereinafter Casino City Response].
35. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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States, and that many of its readers live in countries where Internet gambling is
legal.36 Casino City’s response also reiterated that it could satisfy the test for
commercial speech protection.37 After Casino City filed its response, the DOJ
filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.38
C. Motion to Dismiss Granted, Appeals Follow
The complaint was a risk for Casino City, but perhaps the Internet
gambling industry felt it was worth a try, given that much advertising has
already been blocked.39 If the court had given Casino City the declaratory
judgment it sought, it would have been perceived as a win for the industry that
could result in legitimization or perhaps even a step toward regulation in the
United States. Casino City lost its gamble on February 15, 2005, when the
district court granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.40 In its
ruling, the court also stated that Casino City did not have a valid First
Amendment claim, because if it were prosecuted, it would be for illegal
activities.41 This Comment will analyze Casino City’s First Amendment issue
assuming the company had been found to have standing. It is conceivable that
this issue could come before a court again. Further, due to precedent in the
Fifth Circuit, it is conceivable that a court in the future could find a right to
advertise Internet casinos but not Internet sports books. Commercial speech
doctrine under the First Amendment has been called a compromise between
the rights of consumers to get information about products and the rights of the
government to regulate the sale of products.42 In the case of gambling
36. Id. at 21–22 (“Casino City places advertisements . . . [that] are available for viewing by
tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the Internet, many of whom are
located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised is expressly legal.”).
37. Id. at 23–26. For the test that the Supreme Court uses to determine whether commercial
speech receives First Amendment protection, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
38. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Dec. 3,
2004), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/CasinoCityDOJreplybrief.pdf [hereinafter
DOJ Reply]. On January 27, 2005, Casino City and the DOJ participated in a telephone status
conference. Minute Entry Order at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-BM3 (M.D. La. Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/TelephoneStatus
Conference27January2004.pdf.
39. Interview with Sue Schneider, Internet gambling industry consultant and former
chairman of the Interactive Gaming Council, in St. Charles, Mo. (Oct. 28, 2004).
40. Ruling at 7, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Feb.
15, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/DismissalRulingandOrder.pdf. Casino
City has appealed. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/
NoticeOfAppeal.pdf.
41. Ruling, supra note 40, at 13.
42. E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (“The entire
commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak
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advertisements, however, there is little information to be exchanged other than
alerting consumers that gambling is available.43 Internet gambling is not going
to go away, and perhaps the U.S. government could serve consumers better by
strictly regulating it—and heavily taxing it—than trying to block
advertisements for it.44 But the merits of regulating Internet gambling are a
separate issue. This Comment’s focus is on whether U.S. media companies
have a constitutional right to advertise Internet gambling in the United States
without incurring potential criminal liability.
This Comment will first discuss the relevant First Amendment case law
regarding commercial speech and the Internet. It will then explore the First
Amendment issue in the Casino City complaint via discussion of each element
of the test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a commercial
speech restriction violates the First Amendment.45 As part of the discussion of
each element of the commercial speech test, the Author will analyze how the
court may have ruled on the free speech issue had it not dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW
A.

Commercial Speech and Gambling

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall
make no law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”46 Many
people view free speech as the most important right that Americans have.47
and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sale of
such goods and services.”).
43. Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 421
(2003). Ledewitz states:
Anyone who has ever seen or heard gambling advertising knows that by and large it
contains no information. Rather, the point of the advertising is to remind people that
gambling is available, and the point of limiting advertising is to keep susceptible people
from being reminded of the temptation to gamble. Does a ban on gambling advertising
then manipulate the flow of information, as supporters of commercial speech fear, or
“manipulate” the flow of manipulation?
Id.
44. For support of legalization and regulation of Internet gambling in the United States, see
Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition Will Ultimately Fail, 8
GAMING L. REV. 295, 298 (2004); R. Scott Girdwood, Place Your Bets . . . on the Keyboard: Are
Internet Casinos Legal?, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 135, 148 (2002); Friedrich, supra note 10, at
370.
45. For an explanation of elements of the test used by Supreme Court in commercial free
speech cases, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. ROY L. MOORE ET AL., ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS LAW 14–15 (1998)
(“[M]any believe almost all other interests are subservient to [free speech] . . . .”). Another writer
considers free speech essential for “individual liberty.” “The First Amendment protects a person’s
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The executive and judicial branches are also forbidden from infringing on
constitutionally protected speech.48 The Supreme Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence is an anomaly in First Amendment law, which for the most part
does not allow speech to be distinguished solely based on content.49
Commercial speech was given First Amendment protection for the first
time in 1975 with Bigelow v. Virginia50 and the next year in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council.51 The test for whether commercial free
speech is protected was first put forth by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,52 a landmark
case that came on the heels of the Pharmacy and Bigelow decisions.53 The
standard of judicial review for commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson
is the current standard.54
In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission had banned
promotional advertising of the appellant utility company that had a monopoly
The commission wanted to discourage energy
in its service area.55
56
consumption. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, articulated the test for
whether commercial speech is protected:
[I]t must at least concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.57

use of speech to order and create the world in a desired way and as a tool for understanding and
communicating about that world in ways he or she finds important. These uses are fundamental
aspects of individual liberty and choice.” C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 196 (1989).
48. EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE
SPEECH 3 (1985).
49. Id. at 4. One reason commercial speech is granted less protection than other kinds of
speech is that commercial speech is profit oriented. BAKER, supra note 47, at 196. According to
Baker, commercial speech “lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and selfrealization that are central to justifications for the constitutional protection of speech,
justifications that in turn define the proper scope of protection under the first amendment.” Id.
50. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
51. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 392–93. In Pharmacy, the Court gave
three justifications for protecting advertising: First, commercial speech is similar to other types of
protected speech; second, access to advertising promotes an efficient market through cost savings
that benefit consumers; and third, judgments about how to regulate the market may depend on the
free flow of information. Id. at 393.
52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 394.
54. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 116–17.
55. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
56. Id. at 560.
57. Id. at 566.
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Applying the test, Powell wrote that the commission did not state whether the
activity in question, regarding public utilities, is lawful or misleading.58 The
state did have a clear and substantial interest in keeping utility rates fair and
efficient.59 The state’s interest in energy conservation was directly advanced
by the advertising ban because there was a direct connection between
advertising and demand for electricity.60 However, the commission failed the
last prong because it did not demonstrate that its interest in energy
conservation could not be adequately protected by a less-restrictive method.61
The commission could, for instance, require the utility to promote the relative
efficiency of some of its products.62 The Court’s rationale for protecting some,
but not all, commercial speech is that commercial speech proposes a
commercial transaction, an area traditionally regulated by the government.63
Further, advertisers are in a good position to judge the accuracy of their speech
and its lawfulness.64
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Central Hudson.65 He wrote that because
the utility was a monopoly, it deserved more supervision than an ordinary
corporation.66 He also stated that the fourth prong of the test was misguided
because it “leaves room for so many hypothetical ‘better’ ways that any
ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the invalidation of
what the state agency actually did.”67 A question remaining after Central
Hudson is one that remains today: whether commercial speech is any less
protected than other kinds of speech.68
Two years after Central Hudson, the Court explicitly stated that when
commercial speech proposes an illegal transaction, the government may
regulate or entirely ban the speech.69 In that case, Village of Hoffman Estates
58. Id.
59. Id. at 569.
60. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
61. Id. at 570.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 562. The Court’s rationale for protecting commercial speech that passes the test
can be broken into five parts. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 82–83. Briefly put, the Court
first stated that commercial speech should be protected because it is in society’s interest to have
the fullest possible sharing of information. Id. at 82. Second, the Court rejected the “highly
paternalistic view” that the government can suppress all commercial speech. Id. at 83. Third,
people will perceive their own best interest if they are fully informed, and open channels of
communication promote that. Id. Fourth, even though advertising gives only one side of the
facts, this is better than nothing. Id. And fifth, the protection for commercial speech is based on
the informational function of advertising. Id.
64. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 82 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6).
65. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583.
66. Id. at 587; see Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395.
67. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 599–600.
68. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395–96.
69. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982).
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v. Flipside, the Court upheld an ordinance regulating the sale of drug-related
goods and literature.70 The Court stated that the only speech interest
implicated was the display of the merchandise.71 In Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,72 the Court held that it was not a
violation of free speech to prohibit a newspaper from running employment
advertisements in separate columns for men and women, because that type of
sex discrimination is an illegal activity.73
Six years after Central Hudson was decided, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the majority opinion in a decision that directly addressed gambling
advertisements. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico,74 the appellant operated a legal casino in Puerto Rico.75 It was
illegal to advertise or otherwise offer gambling facilities to the public of Puerto
Rico.76 The appellant had been fined twice for breaking the advertising
restriction and sought a declaratory judgment that the statute prohibiting casino
advertising violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause.77 The Court said that because the speech did no more
than propose a commercial transaction, the Central Hudson test should be
applied.78 Rehnquist found that the activity was not illegal, misleading, or
fraudulent in the abstract.79 The state did have a substantial interest in
reducing the demand for gambling among the territory’s residents,80 the
government interest was directly advanced by the speech restriction, and the
statute against advertising was no more restrictive than necessary.81
Significantly, Rehnquist stated that because the Puerto Rico Legislature could
have completely banned casino gambling, it therefore had the power to ban
advertisement of casino gambling.82 Rehnquist wrote:

70. Id. at 495–97.
71. Id. at 496.
72. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
73. Id. at 391.
74. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
75. Id. at 333.
76. Id. at 332. It was permitted to advertise to tourists. Id. at 332–33.
77. Id. at 333–34.
78. Id. at 340.
79. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340–41.
80. Id. at 341. The Tourism Company, which was charged with administering the statute on
gambling advertisement prohibition, stated:
Excessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful
effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the
disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of
prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime.
Id.
81. Id. at 342–43.
82. Id. at 345–46; see Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 396.
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[I]t would be a . . . strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the
legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the
legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or
activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such
increased demand.83

The Posadas decision has been criticized; one gambling law expert, I. Nelson
Rose, said that it “warped the First Amendment.”84
The Court observed, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox,85 that none of its past invalidation of government regulation of
commercial speech involved rules that only “marginally” failed the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test.86 “[A]lmost all of the restrictions disallowed
under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have been substantially excessive,
disregarding ‘far less restrictive and more precise means,’” Justice Scalia
stated for the Court.87 On the other hand, when the Court upholds speech
restrictions under the test, it does not first have to be satisfied that the
government is employing the least restrictive means.88 The restriction in
question in Fox was a university rule against selling commercial goods at
university facilities.89 The Court ultimately decided that the claim was not ripe
for resolution.90 The Court stated that to pass muster under the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test, there must be a reasonable “fit” between the
legislature’s ends and the means by which those ends are to be accomplished.91
The means, in other words, must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decision makers to
judge what manner of regulation may be best employed.”92 The Court thus
declared that the fit does not need to be perfect or the single best way to
prevent the stated harm, but it should not be totally disproportionate to the
harm, either.
Ten years after Posadas, the Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island.93 The decision “formally repudiated” Posadas.94 A liquor retailer had
83. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
84. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Understanding the Law of Internet Gambling, in
89 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 177, 179 (2001). Rose writes that the Court’s
holding “is like saying that if a state may punish murder with the death penalty it can also punish
murder with anything short of the death penalty, such as torture.” Id.
85. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
86. Id. at 479.
87. Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 471–72.
90. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485–86.
91. Id. at 480 (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
328, 341 (1986)).
92. Id.
93. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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brought a declaratory action challenging, on First Amendment grounds, a
Rhode Island law prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices. 95 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the First Amendment calls for
skepticism of any regulation that seeks “to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.”96 He concluded that the Court in
Posadas got the First Amendment analysis wrong.97 The Court in Posadas
should not have ruled that because the legislature may ban the conduct, it may
ban speech about the conduct.98 The Constitution, Stevens wrote, “presumes
that attempts to regulate speech are actually more dangerous than attempts to
regulate conduct.”99 He continued, “[S]peech restrictions cannot be treated as
simply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.”100
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States,101 the Court
again faced the issue of gambling advertisements. The case concerned the
Communications Act of 1934,102 which prohibits radio and television
broadcast of advertisements for privately operated casinos or lotteries.103
Louisiana broadcasters sought a declaratory judgment that the ban amounted to
a free speech violation and also sought an injunction preventing enforcement
of the statute.104 Applying Central Hudson, the Court found that the conduct
was legal and not misleading.105 Justice Stevens wrote that while the
government interest in lessening social ills associated with gambling is
substantial, the federal policy of discouraging gambling is “decidedly
equivocal,” because Congress has also passed pro-gaming laws, such as those
relating to tribal gambling.106 Further, the social costs of gambling are offset
and sometimes outweighed by economic benefits.107 As for the third prong of
the test, the restriction was found not to materially advance the government’s
goals.108 The advertisements could be seen merely to channel a gambler from
one casino to another, not to encourage more gambling.109 Additionally,
Congress was simultaneously encouraging tribal casino gambling, which could
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 397.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 492–93.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 512.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 512.
527 U.S. 173 (1999).
18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000).
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 186.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 189.
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also increase problem gaming.110 The Court held the government failed to
specifically connect private casino gambling with gambling addiction via
broadcast advertisements.111 Last, the Court found that it did not matter
whether the restriction is more than what is necessary to advance the
government’s interest, because section 1304 of the Communications Act is “so
pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to
exonerate it.”112 The Act contained exemptions for almost every sub-group of
gambling.113
In recent years, some members of the Court have expressed doubt about
the Central Hudson test and when it should be applied.114 One commentator
stated that the level of First Amendment protection for advertising seems to be
rising and that some day it could be entitled to the highest sort of constitutional
protection.115 In some of the commercial speech cases from the last decade,
members of the Court have dissented to state their dissatisfaction with the
Central Hudson test. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,116 Justice Kennedy
stated concern in his concurrence that the test gives “insufficient protection to
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech” and that all government restraint
of truthful speech should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.117 In 44
Liquormart, Justice Scalia expressed “discomfort” about the test, but wrote
that the Court does not have the “wherewithal” to replace it.118 Justice Thomas
concurred in that case, declaring that when the government’s asserted interest
is to withhold information from legal users of a product or service, the Central
Hudson test should not be applied.119 While Central Hudson is the test that is
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 190. Additionally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court
struck down a prohibition on advertising of compounded drugs. 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002). The
Court ruled that speech prohibitions must be the government’s last resort: “If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.”
Id. at 373.
113. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190. Gambling sub-groups could include lotteries,
horse racing, greyhound racing, legal bookmaking, and gambling on Indian reservations. See
Christiansen, supra note 19, at 39 tbl.1.
114. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367.
115. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395, 398.
116. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
117. Id. at 571–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
118. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–18 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
119. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring in the
judgment).
Thomas wrote: “[T]he Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh
incommensurables—the value of knowledge versus the value of ignorance—and to apply
contradictory premises—that informed adults are the best judges of their own interests, and that
they are not.” Id. at 528. Thomas also stated that the test is difficult to uniformly apply and that
it leads to a case-by-case balancing test susceptive to individual judicial preference. Id. at 527.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1302

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1289

still used by the Court, based on these concurring and dissenting opinions,
Central Hudson may someday no longer be the test used to weigh First
Amendment protection for commercial speech. No member of the Court,
however, has spoken up in favor of protected commercial speech that
advertises illegal behavior.
B.

Free Speech and the Internet

In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), which aimed to prevent children from seeing pornography on the
Internet, violated the First Amendment.120 While this was not a commercial
speech case, some parts of the opinion are useful to the complaint at hand. The
Court noted at the outset that the Internet is a “unique and wholly new medium
of worldwide human communication.”121 Justice Stevens, author of the
majority opinion, wrote: “The Web is thus comparable, from the readers’
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and
indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.”122
Stevens also expressed the rarity with which one encounters Internet content
randomly.123 “Unlike communications received by radio or television, ‘the
receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial.’”124 The Court also
stated that it has often recognized that the government has an interest in
protecting children from harmful materials.125 However that interest does not
justify an overbroad restriction of speech that “reduce[s] the adult
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”126
After the judgment in Reno, Congress passed the Child Online Protection
Act (COPA), which was meant to achieve the same purpose as the CDA.127
The Court ultimately struck COPA down as well, stating that less-restrictive
means are available to protect children from pornography.128 Justice Kennedy,
For another example of disapproval of the Central Hudson test, see the concurrence of Justice
Stevens in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to the test as “misguided”).
120. Reno v. ALCU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). The Court struck down the CDA in Reno v.
ACLU because “it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and less
restrictive means were available.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004).
121. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 853.
123. Id. at 854.
124. Id. (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 875.
126. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 717, 759 (1996)).
127. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004).
128. Id. at 665. A less-restrictive method of protecting children from Web porn would be
installment of filtering software on the family computer. Id. at 667.
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writing for the majority, and Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, made a
few points relevant to the Internet gambling advertising issue. First, Kennedy
noted the district court’s finding that forty percent of “harmful-to-minors
content” comes from overseas, beyond the reach of COPA.129 American
providers of this content could simply move overseas to avoid COPA.130
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, wrote that “[g]overnment may not
penalize speakers for making available to the general World Wide Web
audience that which the least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for
their children’s consumption.”131 Stevens also noted that he is uneasy with
using criminal statutes as a substitute for parental control over children’s Web
use.132
III. APPLICATION OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST TO CASINO CITY’S
COMPLAINT
The First Amendment applies to speech on the Internet, and laws
governing traditional advertising also apply to Internet advertising.133 Internet
gambling itself is not a free speech concern; governments around the world
treat it as a problem within gambling law rather than within communications
law.134 In the United States, regulation of gambling is reserved to the states
through the Tenth Amendment, and there is no constitutional right to
gamble.135 This unlimited power to prohibit gambling is a contrast to the

129. Id.
130. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667.
131. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 675.
133. Linda A. Goldstein, Update on Internet Advertising and Promotions, 691 PRACTISING L.
INST. 1169, 1176 (2002). Because the United States values free speech, it does not go as far as
some other countries in controlling Internet content through Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Anthony Cabot, Prohibitory Challenges, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 190.
134. Rose, supra note 84, at 178–79. U.S. federal courts have ruled that gambling is a
commercial act and is therefore not subject to First Amendment protection as pure speech.
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-12.
135. Rose, supra note 84, at 180 (citing State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (1977)).
Gambling has traditionally been seen as a moral issue over which states can use their police
power. Id. at 183. In the United States, gambling regulations are supported by federal law that
prevents undermining of state law by interstate and foreign commerce. GAO REPORT, supra note
3, at 12. State governments undertake most enforcement of gambling laws, but enforcing these
laws on the Internet will “become an insurmountable problem for state governments because they
lack funding, technical capabilities, and the legal authority.” Anthony Cabot, Study Materials for
Internet Gaming: Domestic and International Developments, 81 A.L.I-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS 179, 184 (2000). States recognize this, and the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) has asked Congress to pass a law specific to Internet gambling. Id.; see also
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-9 (quoting NAAG committee member James E. Doyle as
saying that Congress should make Internet gambling illegal: “[S]imply because an activity is
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freedom of speech, and under 44 Liquormart, does not entitle government to
ban advertising about gambling simply because it can ban gambling.136 If
Casino City had been found to have standing, its complaint would probably
have been analyzed under the Central Hudson test.137 The next few sections
discuss how Casino City’s complaint would fare under each of the four prongs
of the test. The threshold question is whether Casino City’s complaint
concerns a legal activity.
A.

Prong One: Legal Activity That is Not Misleading

The first step of the Central Hudson test requires a determination that the
advertised conduct is legal and not misleading.138 The DOJ interprets federal
law to prohibit Internet gambling.139 But federal law could be more specific on
the subject.140 Whether Internet gambling—sports betting or casino games, or
both—is legal is a crucial question. If the DOJ is correct that all Internet
gambling is illegal, Casino City would have no basis to insist that it has a First
Amendment right to post the advertising.141
1.

Arguments

Casino City’s complaint alleged that application of federal gambling law
against it and others similarly situated would violate the First Amendment.142
The DOJ, in its motion to dismiss, brought up Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a newspaper had no constitutional right to run gender-specific helpwanted advertisements because sex discrimination in employment is illegal.143
difficult to control does not mean law enforcement should be forced to stick its head into the sand
and act as though the issue does not exist.”).
136. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980). See Lawrence G. Walters, Advertising and U.S. Law, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT,
supra note 2, at 331, for additional discussion of advertising of Internet gambling.
138. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
139. The DOJ takes the position that any activity that is illegal offline is illegal online. Rose,
supra note 84, at 194; see NAB Letter, supra note 11.
140. Professor I. Nelson Rose of Whittier Law School has said that it is not clear whether
federal law aimed at sports betting also applies to other forms of gambling. Pat King, Legal
Issues Still Unclear on ‘Net Gaming, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Oct. 22, 2001, at 3B; see JARVIS
ET AL., supra note 6, at 563.
141. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1976).
142. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4. Casino City urged that the NAB Letter, as well as the
knowledge that media companies have been subpoenaed regarding Internet gambling advertising,
creates a fear of prosecution and a chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech. Id. at 3.
143. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 18; Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388–89. The
DOJ also noted that in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, in which the Supreme Court held
that to the extent commercial speech proposes an illegal transaction, the government may regulate
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The DOJ stated that if Casino City accepts advertisements for Internet
gambling sites which take bets from U.S. customers, it is advertising illegal
conduct, and there is no First Amendment right to do that.144 Casino City’s
reply did not argue that Internet gambling is a legal, non-misleading activity,
It attempted to make the case that the online gambling
exactly.145
advertisements which it wanted to run should be legal because they target a
worldwide audience that includes jurisdictions where Internet gambling is
legal—that when the medium is the Internet, a country such as the United
States has no right to ban advertisements for conduct that is illegal within its
borders, because such advertisements can also be seen by people in other
countries.146 Casino City stated that the implications for “the Internet and
technology” are the same in this case as they were in Reno v. ACLU and
Ashcroft v. ACLU because the “broad global impact . . . is of special
relevance.”147 Also of relevance was the less-invasive nature of the Internet
compared with radio and television; the Internet requires affirmative steps to
access.148 The Internet, argued Casino City, creates new First Amendment
challenges, and “the DOJ cannot assert that the advertisements placed by
Casino City concern per se illegal conduct,” because of the medium’s
worldwide audience.149 Further, Casino City argued that its claim is more
compelling than that of the gambling advertisers in Greater New Orleans,
because the speech is directed via Internet toward the entire world.150 Last,
Casino City brought up a recent Second Circuit decision about Internet

the speech or ban it entirely. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 18–19; Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982).
144. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 19 n.7 (stating that “if Casino City is running
advertisements for [Internet gambling operations that accept bets from U.S. customers], Casino
City is advertising illegal activity, and such advertisements are unprotected by the First
Amendment regardless of Casino City’s liability under 18 U.S.C. §2 [the aiding and abetting
statute]”).
145. See generally Casino City Response, supra note 34.
146. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 18–23. Casino City stated that it offers
“advertisements for online sports books and casinos on its portals, once there the advertisements
are available for viewing by tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the
Internet, many of whom are located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised
is expressly legal.” Id. at 21–22. One country where Internet gambling is legal is Antigua, which
in November 2004 won a World Trade Organization Panel ruling that U.S. policies against
Internet gambling disagree with the terms of the General Agreement on Trade Services. See id. at
19 n.8; Matt Richtel, U.S. To Appeal W.T.O Ruling that Favored Internet Gambling, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2005, at C4.
147. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 19.
148. Id. at 20.
149. Id. at 21. In a footnote, Casino City referenced cases stating that the adult population
should not necessarily be restricted to reading only what is “fit for children.” Id. at 21 n.11
(citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)).
150. Id. at 22.
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advertising, Swedenburg v. Kelly,151 in which the court struck down a New
York law that prohibited unlicensed wine dealers from advertising or soliciting
sales for alcoholic beverages, regardless of whether the purchase was to be
made in the state or not.152 In Swedenburg, the Court ruled it was a violation
of the First Amendment for New York to declare that wineries couldn’t
advertise on the Internet and include order forms that are legal in their own
states.153
The DOJ replied that Casino City’s arguments had no merit, stating:
“Because it is illegal for plaintiff’s customers to operate anywhere in this
country, plaintiff’s Internet theory is grounded before it can even take
flight.”154 Casino City, it pointed out, had no legal support for the notion that
because an activity is legal somewhere in the world, advertisement of that
activity should be allowed in the United States under Central Hudson.155
“[That] these criminal businesses may be operating legally in other
countries . . . in no way mitigates the seriousness of such violations . . . .”156
Further, the overbreadth doctrine as applied to sexually explicit speech does
not apply to commercial speech; thus, a ban on advertisement of online
gambling in jurisdictions where it is legal cannot chill the same advertisements
in jurisdictions where it is legal.157 Finally, the DOJ argued that Casino City
relied, in error, on cases that concern speech which cannot be banned in any
jurisdiction—such as the indecent material that is the subject of Reno v. ACLU
and Ashcroft v. ACLU.158
2.

Analysis

The DOJ and Casino City made different types of arguments under the first
prong of the Central Hudson test. The DOJ made a traditional argument based
on statutes and precedent. Casino City seemed to be arguing that the illegality
threshold of the Central Hudson test should be reconsidered for Internet
151. 358 F.3d 223, 240 (2d Cir. 2004).
152. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 22–23; Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 240.
153. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 241.
154. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 9.
155. Id. at 9.
Casino City appears to suggest that activity advertised via the Internet should not be
deemed illegal under the first prong of Central Hudson if it is legal anywhere in the
world. It identifies no support in any judicial decision, however, for a rule that would
allow the world’s most permissive legal regime to influence in any way the ability of this
country to enforce its laws.
Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 10 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 670 (1994)).
158. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 11. The DOJ also noted that in Reno v. ACLU, the
Supreme Court “strongly suggested” that it would be possible to entirely ban transmission of
obscenity. Id.
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advertising, because the content will be seen in a variety of jurisdictions with
varying laws about Internet gambling.159
The DOJ stated, both in its pleadings and in its letter to the NAB, that
Internet gambling is illegal in the United States.160 However, as the following
statutes and cases show, it is possible to make the case that, at least as far as
Fifth Circuit precedent is concerned, the legality of Internet casino games—as
opposed to sports betting—is open to differing interpretations.161
The Wire Act is the most commonly used law in Internet gambling
prosecutions.162 The Wire Act makes it illegal for a person or company
engaged in the business of betting to use a “wire communication facility” to
transmit bets or information assisting in the placing of bets across state lines.163
Accepting or arranging bets for a fee usually amounts to being in the business
of betting, and the Wire Act does not apply to the casual bettor who is not in
the business.164 The Act was passed in 1961, obviously before the existence of
the Internet, and the technology to which it refers—a “wire communication
facility”—means “a system that is used to transmit writings, pictures and
sounds ‘by and of a wire, cable or other like connection between points of
origin and reception of such transmission.’”165 Current interpretation of the
Wire Act is that, despite its reference to wires, it applies to Internet
communication.166 Many people access the Internet through telephone lines,
and even if a consumer is placing a bet using a wireless Internet connection,

159. “Because the Net is global, the ads on Casino City may be viewed by anyone, including
people in countries where online gambling is legal.” Ante, supra note 21, at 82.
160. See NAB Letter, supra note 11. Additionally, the DOJ wrote an opinion letter to the
Nevada Gaming Control Board stating that Internet gambling is illegal according to current
federal law. The letter also stated that the DOJ considers the actual gambling activity to occur
both in the jurisdiction of the gambler and that of the gambling company. Gregory Manter, The
Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 16, 10.
161. Casino City and its lawyers told BusinessWeek that only sports betting is illegal online,
and that casino games and bingo are still permitted. Ante, supra note 21, at 82.
162. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-6. See Joseph Kelly et al., U.S. Policy, in INTERNET
GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 257, for additional information and background on the Wire
Act and other federal gambling laws.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). The elements of the Wire Act that the government must
establish to prove its violation are: 1) that an entity is in the business of betting; 2) the entity is
knowingly transmitting bets or information assisting in the placement of bets through a wire
communication facility; 3) the bets are being transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce; and
4) that the betting business or bettors receive money or credit resulting from the bets. Seth
Gorman & Antony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. J. 667, 671 (1996). See generally Cabot, supra note 133, at 187.
164. Cabot, supra note 133, at 188. Some gambling from home on the Internet is not likely to
face liability under the act. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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showing that part of the transmission occurred via a cable or wire would place
the bet within the Wire Act.167 The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its
study of Internet Gambling, noted that while all Internet communication
currently requires some type of telephone or data line, “future Internet
communications may no longer be wire communications covered under the
Wire Act.”168 The GAO also stated that the language “transmission of a wire
communication” is ambiguous because some courts have held that
“transmission” means only sending information, not receiving it.169
A major point of contention is whether the Wire Act applies to casino
games and lotteries.170 The statute refers to bets or wagers “on any sporting
event or contest.”171 As gaming lawyer Anthony Cabot notes: “In 1961, the
notion that persons could use the telephone to wager on anything but sporting
events or horse racing was unrealistic. Thus, the bill drafters prohibited only
the transmission of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.”172 Cabot
sees a strong argument that the Wire Act does not apply to casino games
because the word “sporting” appears to apply to both “event” and “contest.”173
Further, the legislative history of the Wire Act suggests an intent to affect
sports betting.174 Courts have interpreted the language as both including and
excluding communication relating to casino games.175
In addition to the Wire Act, the DOJ also stated that the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act could be applied to media companies via the
aiding and abetting statute.176 The Travel Act, which, like the Wire Act, was

167. Id. Further, the statute does not limit the type of “wire” used, so that computer data lines
probably fall within the Act. “[A]s long as the communication signal traverses a wire at some
point on its journey from the sender to the receiver, the Wire Act becomes applicable.” Jonathan
Gottfried, The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 26, 49 (2004).
168. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
169. Id. at 12–13.
170. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-7 (stating that the Act “lacks clear definition of
‘contest’”).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
172. Cabot, supra note 133, at 188. Some gaming experts believe it is “generally accepted”
that § 1084 does not apply to casino games. Cory Aronovitz & Mark D. Schopper, U.S. Case
Law, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 305, 305.
173. Cabot, supra note 133, at 189.
174. Id.
175. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 12; Walters, supra, note 137, at 344. One example of a
court interpreting the Wire Act as prohibiting Internet casino gambling is Vacco v. World
Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1999), in which the Supreme
Court of New York County held that the Wire Act, Travel Act, and Paraphernalia Act all
prohibited the defendant’s offshore casino. Id.
176. NAB Letter, supra note 11. Gaming law experts state that the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act and the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act could
apply to Internet gambling. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 51. The Interstate Transportation of
Wagering Paraphernalia Act prohibits knowingly carrying or sending in interstate or foreign
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intended to fight organized crime, outlaws travel or use of facilities in
interstate or foreign commerce to conduct a business involving gambling that
is illegal under state or federal law.177 The Act encompasses transport of items
as well as telephone lines carrying gambling information.178 This law is
relatively untested in federal courts, but may relate to a bigger section of the
Internet gambling industry than the Wire Act does because it is not specific to
sports betting.179 It has been applied in New York to an online casino that took
bets from New Yorkers.180
The Illegal Gambling Business Act states that operation of an illegal
gambling business under state law is also an offense under federal law.181 An
illegal gambling business is one that involves five or more people who
“conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such
business” and “has been or remains in substantially continuous operation” for
more than thirty days or has gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.182 This
law has not yet been used to prosecute an Internet gambling enterprise,
although it is “a likely candidate for future use.”183 However, because the law
is predicated on violation of an applicable state or federal law, it would require
that the Internet casino operator be prosecuted under a state or federal law for
Internet gambling offenses.184
For the purposes of this scenario, a significant case that interprets the Wire
Act as only applying to sports betting is In re MasterCard International Inc.185
This case was decided in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, in the same circuit where Casino City’s complaint was filed. The
plaintiffs had used credit cards to gamble online, and they filed a class-action
lawsuit against MasterCard and Visa stating that they would not have gambled
online had their credit cards not been accepted by the Internet casinos.186 The
plaintiffs brought RICO allegations against the defendant credit card
companies, stating that the defendants were engaged in a worldwide gambling
commerce any paraphernalia or device to be used in illegal gambling activities. Id. The
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act makes it illegal for states and tribes to offer
betting on sporting events, but it has a grandfather clause for states that already allow sports
betting. Wendy J. Johnson, Trial Gaming Expansion in Oregon, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 399,
426 (2001).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000).
178. I. Nelson Rose, Internet Gambling: Statutes and International Law, 81 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 233, 245 (2000).
179. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 52.
180. Id. (citing Vacco, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 851).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000); see Rose, supra note 178, at 244.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
183. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 53.
184. Id.
185. See Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 319.
186. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474–75 (E.D. La. 2001).
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enterprise through racketeering activity and collection of unlawful debt.187 In
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court held that the Wire Act
only applies to sports betting.188 The court stated:
Since plaintiffs have failed to allege that they engaged in sports gambling, and
internet gambling in connection with activities other than sports betting is not
illegal under federal law, plaintiffs have no cause of action against the credit
card companies or the banks under the Wire Act.189

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, stating
that “the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling.”190 Casino
City’s complaint, it should be noted, refers to chilled speech concerning
advertisements for both casino gambling and sports betting.191
There are, however, instances in which courts have decided that both
Internet casino gambling and sports betting violate federal law. In a New York
state case, Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., the attorney general of
New York sought to enjoin an Internet gambling company based in Antigua
from offering its services to the state’s residents.192 The court ruled that the
Internet gambling company violated the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Paraphernalia Act.193 The court did not limit the scope of the Wire Act to
casino games.194 The court stated that “[t]he Internet site creates a virtual
casino within the user’s computer terminal,” and therefore “[b]y hosting this
casino and exchanging betting information with the user, an illegal
communication in violation of the Wire Act and the Travel Act has
occurred.”195
Some gambling experts, after In re MasterCard, believe that a change in
federal law is now required for the DOJ to enforce the Wire Act against
Internet gambling companies for offering games of chance or skill—casino
games.196 The DOJ strongly disagreed with the result of In re MasterCard197
187. Id.
188. Id. at 480.
189. Id. at 481 (footnotes omitted).
190. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). While this interpretation
of the Wire Act is binding in the Fifth Circuit, it does not necessarily mean that Internet casinos
are legal in those states. Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 320. The tone of the Fifth
Circuit’s decision is that online gamblers cannot escape credit card debt from Internet casinos—in
accruing such debt, they “got what they bargained for.” Id. at 321.
191. Complaint, supra note 21, at 2.
192. 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847–48 (N.Y. 1999).
193. Id. at 851. “[T]he Wire Act, Travel Act and Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the fact
that the betting instructions are transmitted from outside the United States over the Internet. The
scope of these statutes clearly extends to the transmission of betting information to a foreign
country . . . .” Id.
194. Id. at 852.
195. Id.
196. Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 319–20.
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but conceded that the decision “is binding in this circuit.”198 Therefore, a court
would probably find that advertising Internet sports betting is an illegal activity
and that Internet casino advertising is not. In other words, a company like
Casino City could legally run the Internet casino advertisements, but not
Internet sports betting advertisements.
That Casino City posts advertising on the Internet as opposed to some
other medium does not change the final result. Casino City’s argument that its
advertisements are aimed at a worldwide, Internet audience and should
therefore be protected is ultimately unconvincing. Two of the cases on which
Casino City relies—Reno and Ashcroft—dealt with statutes concerning
obscene and indecent speech that may be constitutionally prohibited towards
minors, but not towards adults absent certain circumstances.199 It is within the
context of prohibition of obscene speech that the Court in Reno made its
statements about the Internet being a “vast platform from which to address and
hear from a worldwide audience.”200 In those cases, the statutes at issue,
COPA and the CDA, were struck down because of other issues, such as
ambiguity and the availability of less-restrictive alternatives.201 Reno, in fact,
has been called “a relatively narrow decision [that] did little to establish the
First Amendment parameters of the Internet.”202 Casino City is concerned
with commercial speech, and under Pittsburgh Press, any commercial speech
about illegal activity may be prohibited.203 Therefore, Casino City’s complaint
is distinguishable from Reno and Ashcroft because it deals with a type of
speech that may constitutionally be denied to all parts of the population
without regard to age.

This is the first time a federal court has expressly determined that section 1084 is
restricted to wagering on sporting events or contests. . . . [I]t appears rather certain that
federal law enforcement will not be able to prosecute Internet casinos under the strictures
of the Wire Act for offering games of chance and skill.
Id.
197. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at n.8.
198. Id.
199. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–65 (1997). As Justice Stevens noted in his majority
opinion in Reno, the government may prohibit selling to material to people under age seventeen
on grounds that the material is “obscene as to them, even if it is not obscene as to adults.” Id. at
864.
200. Id. at 853.
201. Id. at 874 (applying the CDA); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791–92 (2004)
(applying COPA).
202. Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. the Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to
Internet Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 426 (1999).
203. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973).
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Swedenburg v. Kelly,204 another case on which Casino City relied, is also
distinguishable. There, the court ruled that New York’s statute was too broad
because it encompassed some protected speech, such as legal advertising in
other states.205 Here, however, commercial speech about Internet sports
betting is, under the Wire Act, illegal in every state. Casino City seems to
have argued on behalf of the rights of people in other countries to see its ads.
Jack M. Balkin, a law professor who was interviewed by BusinessWeek about
the Casino City complaint, indicated that U.S. courts are not interested in
giving First Amendment protection to “[w]eb surfers beyond [the United
States’s] borders.”206 It is entirely possible for a resident of Amsterdam to
subscribe to The New York Times, yet no one would expect that newspaper to
advertise products that are legal in the Netherlands but illegal in the United
States. Further, when Casino City states that its advertisements are intended
for a worldwide audience, that statement should be read with an implied wink.
Practically speaking, Americans make up an estimated 50 to 70 percent of the
Internet gambling customer base.207 A main purpose of marketing Internet
gambling is to attract Americans’ attention.208 The Internet is a new area of
First Amendment law, but it seems unlikely that courts will overlook the
illegality threshold of the Central Hudson test to allow Casino City to run
advertising for Internet sports betting.
B.

Prong Two: Substantial State Interest

Should Casino City succeed on the threshold question of the legality of
Internet gambling, the court would consider the remainder of the Central
Hudson test, including whether the government’s interest in prohibiting the

204. 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
205. Swedenberg, 358 F.3d at 240–41.
While the state can limit illegal sales of alcohol, section 102(1)(a) broadly encompasses
protected speech. . . . [I]f plaintiff-appellees’ wineries advertised on the Internet and
included an order form that is lawful in their own states, the advertisement would be
illegal in New York, even if it contained language limiting sales to states in which such
orders were lawful.
Id.
206. Ante, supra note 21, at 84.
207. Parke & Griffiths, supra note 44, at 295.
208. For example:
United States citizens currently play a major role in supporting the Internet gambling
industry . . . . In 1999, the United States players made up nearly 80 percent of Internet
players. One Australian Internet gambling operator estimated that 98 percent of its
players were persons from the United States.
Antonia Z. Cowan, The Global Gambling Village: Interstate and Transnational Gambling, 7
GAMING L. REV. 251, 252 (2003).
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The government bears the burden of proving its

Arguments

The Casino City complaint simply stated that the government has no
substantial interest to justify the DOJ’s imposition on commercial speech in
this context.211 The DOJ, in its motion to dismiss, argued that the government
has a substantial interest in enforcing its criminal laws and in reducing aid to
gambling operations that violate those criminal laws.212 The DOJ pointed to
three prior First Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court held that the
state has a substantial interest in reducing gambling through laws that address
advertisement of gambling.213 Those cases are United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association Inc. v.
United States, and Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico.214
In Posadas, the Court had “no difficulty” concluding that the Puerto Rico
Legislature had a substantial interest in banning casino advertisements which
targeted local residents.215 The Court quoted the Tourism Company’s brief as
saying that excessive casino gambling among locals would produce serious
harmful effects on their health, safety, and welfare.216 The Court stated that
these same concerns are what motivate states to ban gambling entirely.217 In
Edge, the Court held that the federal government has a substantial interest in
supporting states that do not want lotteries within their borders, as well as
those that do permit lotteries, by allowing states to disallow lottery advertising
on the radio.218
In Greater New Orleans, the Court wrote that “[n]o one seriously doubts”
that the federal government may have a substantial interest in reducing the
social problems that the Solicitor General, in that case, attributed to
gambling.219 Moreover, the DOJ emphasized that in all three of those cases,
209. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
210. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).
211. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.
212. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 19–20.
213. Id. at 20.
214. Id.
215. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
219. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 20 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass’n v. United States 527 U.S. 173, 186 (1999)); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S.
at 185–86 (quoting the Solicitor General as stating that gambling is “a regressive tax on for the
poor” and leads to corruption, organized crime, bribery, narcotics trafficking, economic losses to
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the advertising in question related to legal gambling—in contrast to Internet
gambling advertising, which “[w]ith very few exceptions limited to licensed
sportsbook operations in Nevada,” is prohibited by state and federal law.220
The DOJ rounded out its argument on the subject of substantial interest by
noting that Internet gambling is “particularly pernicious” because it can be
accessed easily by anyone, even children and compulsive gamblers.221
Additionally, there is “potential for fraud and money laundering.”222 The DOJ
quoted title 14, section 90 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which prohibits
gambling by computer. This statute notes in its introductory section that the
state legislature is responsible for protecting its citizens, especially children
and those with an addiction to gambling, from the increased availability of
gambling services.223
In Casino City’s response to the DOJ’s motion to dismiss, it argued that
the three cases relied on by the DOJ under the “substantial interest” prong were
further along in their proceedings than the present litigation, and were being
reviewed after summary judgment, or other relief, was either granted or
denied.224 Casino City also argues that in Greater New Orleans, while the
Court did find a substantial state interest in regulating gambling advertising, it
held that finding was “by no means self-evident.”225 In that decision, the Court
also noted that sometimes the social ills caused by gambling are offset by
economic benefits.226 In this litigation, Casino City argued, “It is just too early
to determine that such interests are self-evident.”227 Casino City also noted
that the Louisiana computer gambling statute provides that advertising
computer gambling does not violate the statute against computer gambling in
Louisiana.228

gamblers, their families, communities, and government as well as street, white-collar, and
organized crime).
220. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 20–21 (quoting NAB Letter, supra note 11).
221. Id. at 21.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (2004).
224. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 23.
225. Id. at 23–24 (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 186).
226. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 24.
227. Id. In the DOJ’s Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed after Casino City’s response, the DOJ reiterated that the Supreme Court on three separate
occasions has found that there is a substantial interest in reducing even legal gambling. DOJ
Reply, supra note 38, at 12. “In any event, whatever the federal government’s interest in
reducing legal gambling activity, there is no basis for contending that the government lacks a
substantial interest in enforcing laws proscribing illegal gambling,” the DOJ stated. Id.
228. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 24. The DOJ, in its Reply Brief, noted that it
was relying on the Louisiana computer gambling statute because its preamble points out the easy
accessibility of it. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 13.
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Analysis

Both precedent and social factors relating to Internet gambling seem to be
in favor of the DOJ. First, Greater New Orleans does not seem to point to a
certain conclusion that a state could potentially not have a substantial interest
in reducing gambling, so much as it makes the government’s case harder to
prove. The Court noted that Congress has declined to adopt a national policy
against gambling.229 If there is any policy, it is to leave the matter to the
states.230
Additionally, Congress has actually allowed the proliferation of new
gambling opportunities, including sanctioning American Indian gaming and
enacting statutes that “reflect approval of state legislation” that allows for
activities like casino gambling and lotteries.231 In a footnote, the Court took a
survey of legal gambling, and found that some form of it is available in thirtyseven states and the District of Columbia.232 Today, gambling is legal in all
but two states—Utah and Hawaii.233 This is what it seems the Court was
referring to when it stated that federal gambling policy is “decidedly
equivocal.”234 The federal government, on the other hand, has displayed no
equivocation when it comes to Internet gambling. Congress has passed no
laws allowing states to license and regulate Internet gambling, and no
agreements have been forged with Native American tribes giving them the
right to operate gambling Web sites. The executive branch, through the DOJ,
interprets federal law to prohibit all Internet gambling. Only one state,
Nevada, has passed legislation allowing for the development of regulations of
Internet gambling.235 However, due to federal gambling laws and the lack of
an ability to confine online gambling within its borders, Nevada has never
passed enabling regulations.236 These facts make it seem likely that a court
could find that the DOJ does have a substantial interest in prohibiting Internet
gambling and the social ills that are particular to it.

229. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 187 (1999).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 187.
232. Id. at 186 n.5.
233. All Bets Are On, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 68. Thirty-nine U.S. states allow lotteries;
thirty-four states allow casinos. Id.
234. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 187.
235. See Jeff Simpson, Gaming Regulators Seek Legal Advice, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 30,
2001, at 3D.
236. See Terry Lane, Nev. Questions Interstate Internet Gambling Legality, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, Mar. 25, 2002, (page number unavailable). In June 2002, the Nevada legislature passed a
law that would allow casinos meeting certain requirements to operate Internet gambling Web
sites. Id. Built into the law was a requirement that the Nevada Gaming Control Board could not
approve any online gambling sites until technology was available to filter out minors, ensure
fairness of the games, and determine in what state a user is located. Id.
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Additionally, the social issues that inevitably come up in any discussion of
Internet gambling probably justify a substantial interest in reducing or
prohibiting the advertising of Internet gambling. Four widely cited problems
related to Internet gambling are fraud, money laundering, gambling addiction,
and underage gambling.237
The potential for fraud is present in Internet gambling because the player
has little independent assurance that the games are fair or that he will be paid if
he wins.238 There is also the possibility that unscrupulous Internet gambling
operators will take advantage of players’ credit card numbers or other sensitive
information.239 Money laundering is another issue. An Internet casino could
aid a money launderer by allowing him or her to deposit money via credit card
or wire transfer into an account with the casino, gamble with some of the
money, and then withdraw the money from the account.240 Internet casinos
operating in jurisdictions that provide only loose or nonexistent regulation may
not have the same money laundering oversight control as land-based gambling
operations.241 The GAO Report stated that the FBI believes Internet gambling
to be a money laundering risk.242 However, the report also stated that banking
and gaming regulatory officials did not believe Internet gambling to present a
The CEO of BETonSPORTS.com, David
money laundering risk.243
Carruthers, called the idea that money could be laundered through Web casinos
“hogwash.”244 He went further to state, “The very nature of the Internet is that
every transaction is completely auditable from beginning to end. Every
keystroke is logged into our system. We are more auditable, more

237. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 15–37.
238. Id. at 16. With sports betting, however, the customer can independently verify the
outcome of the game and will thus know if he won or lost money. NGISC REPORT, supra note
14, at 5-3.
239. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-5. Additionally, computer hackers may be able to
manipulate games. Id.
240. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 17 (stating that Internet gambling sites could help with the
“layering” phase of money laundering).
To launder money, a person need only deposit money into an offshore account, use those
funds to gamble, lose a small percent of the original funds, then cash out the remaining
funds. Through the dual protection of encryption and anonymity, much of this activity
can take place undetected.
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-6.
241. See NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-5, for the proposition that “[l]ack of
accountability also raises the potential for criminal activities, which can occur in several ways.”
242. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 35–37. In 2002 the FBI said it had two open cases
involving Internet gambling as a vehicle for money laundering, and a Financial Action Task
Force report in 2001 stated that some of its member jurisdictions had evidence of Internet
gambling being used to launder money. Id. at 35–36.
243. Id. at 37.
244. American Citizens Want to Gamble on the Internet, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 66.
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scrupulously clean than the land-based operators.”245 It should be pointed out
that many Internet gambling companies are publicly traded on foreign markets
and some are also members of the Interactive Gaming Council, a trade
organization for the industry.246 Clearly, law enforcement and business
representatives disagree about the potential for money laundering in Internet
gambling.
Gambling addiction and underage gambling are also areas of concern.
Pathological gambling, or gambling addiction, is classified as a disorder by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV.247 The National
Gambling Impact Study Commission Report cites a 1997 analysis by the
Harvard Medical School Division on Addictions as finding that there are about
125 million Americans who gamble, and of them, 7.5 million are either
problem or pathological gamblers.248 Mark Griffiths, a professor of gambling
studies at the International Gaming Research Unit at Nottingham Trent
University, stated that social environment and the design of the gambling
activity are factors in determining how people become addicted to gambling.249
There are a variety of features of Internet gambling that distinguish it from
traditional gambling. Most of them seem to weigh against the interests of a
problem gambler.250 These features include: round-the-clock access, ability to
gamble during the work day, lower initial wagers, and the greater use of
245. Id.
246. PartyGaming, owner of top poker Web site PartyPoker.com, went public on the London
Stock Exchange in July of 2005; it was valued at $10 billion. Peter Gumbel, How the U.S. Is
Getting Beat in Online Gambling, TIME, Nov. 28, 2005, A1, at A2. MGM Mirage at one time
operated an offshore Internet gambling site, but shut the site down because it could not take bets
from U.S. players and was therefore losing money. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Nov.
20, 2005). For information on the Interactive Gaming Council, see Interactive Gaming Council,
About Us, http://www.igcouncil.org/aboutus.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
247. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 30–31 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31 (4th ed. 2000)).
248. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 4-1. Pathological gambling is defined, according to
the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), as an impulse control disorder. Id. The DSM-IV lists ten criteria used in
diagnosis, including “repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back or stop gambling” and
committing “illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement to finance gambling.” Id.
A “problem gambler,” by contrast, experiences adverse consequences that fall below the
threshold of at least five of the ten criteria used to diagnose pathological gambling. Id.
249. Gamblers’ Brains Addiction Clue, BBC News, Jan. 10, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4154709.stm; see also Gary Rivlin, The Chrome-Shiny, LightsFlashing, Wheel-Spinning, Touch-Screened, Drew-Carey-Wisecracking, Video-Playing, ‘Sound
Events’-Packed, Pulse-Quickening Bandit, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004, at 46–47. Howard
Shaffer, the director of the Division on Addictions at Harvard Medical School, said that when
humans are confronted with a situation in which they will be rewarded intermittently, such as
with a slot machine, they will pursue winning with a “persistent tenacity. That hard-wiring that
nature gave us didn’t anticipate electronic gaming devices.” Id. at 47.
250. Cabot, supra note 133, at 182.
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technology by young people.251 Internet gambling is a concern for groups that
treat gambling addiction, such as the National Council on Problem
Gambling.252 Keith Whyte, the group’s executive director, said risks unique to
online gambling include social isolation and unlimited access.253 For these
reasons, Internet gambling has been referred to as the “crack cocaine of
gambling” by legislators who want to ban the activity in the United States.254
Regarding underage gambling, the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission Report stated that an estimated 7.9 million American adolescents
have problem or pathological gambling addiction.255 In 1998, two gambling
addiction researchers at the University of Minnesota, Randy Stinchfield and
Ken C. Winters, wrote that one possible way to prevent gambling addiction
among adolescents is for the government and the gambling industry to monitor
gambling advertisements, which only present the positive side of gambling.256
“While most adults are able to see through this veneer, many adolescents may
not be,” they wrote.257 Internet gambling in particular is attractive to
teenagers, both because most teenagers are Web-savvy, and because many
Internet gambling sites feature graphics and sound that blur the line between
gambling and video gaming.258 A recent test by Gamcare, a British group that
promotes responsible gaming, found that only seven of thirty-seven gambling
Web sites prevented a 16-year-old from registering to gamble online.259
For the most part, the same concerns that have been discussed regarding
Internet gambling were listed by the government in Greater New Orleans as
reasons for its substantial interest in prohibiting broadcast of casino
advertisements.260 There, the Supreme Court found a substantial interest, but
expressed some hesitation about it. Gambling, the Court stated, sometimes

251. Id.
252. Andrea Orr, Online Poker’s Flush with Success as More Folks Deal Themselves In,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 1, 2004, at A04.
253. Id.
254. House Bid to Curb Internet Gambling Yields Tangled Web of Legislation, ELECTRONIC
COM. NEWS, June 9, 2003 (page number unavailable) (quoting Rep. Howard Coble as saying,
“Virtual casinos and their video game structure have been labeled the crack cocaine of
gambling.”).
255. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 4-1.
256. Randy Stinchfield & Ken C. Winters, Gambling and Problem Gambling Among Youths,
556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172, 183 (1998).
257. Id.
258. Jeffrey L. Derevensky et al., Adolescent Problem Gaming: Legislative and Policy
Decisions, 8 GAMING L. REV. 107, 112 (2004). Additionally, “[p]roblem and pathological
gambling amongst adolescents has been shown to result in increased delinquency and crime, the
disruption of familial relationships and multiple mental health, legal, academic and behavioral
problems.” Id. at 109.
259. All Bets Are On, supra note 233, at 69.
260. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999).
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comes with economic benefits that can balance the costs.261 However, Internet
gambling doesn’t provide an economic benefit in the United States in the way
land-based casinos do.262 It provides no jobs for casino and hotel staff and no
tax dollars for schools and government programs. All the monetary benefits to
Internet gambling flow offshore.263 Given the ease with which the Court has in
the past found a substantial interest in prohibiting speech about gambling,
combined with the significant possible social detriments associated with
Internet gambling, it seems likely that the Court could rule in favor of the DOJ
on the subject of substantial interest.
C. Prong Three: Direct Advancement of Asserted Interest
A court must next determine whether the regulation directly advances the
asserted governmental interest.264 In their pleadings and memoranda, the
parties did not focus as much attention on this prong as they did on the other
prongs.265
1.

Arguments

In its complaint, Casino City stated that the DOJ’s threat to prosecute
advertisers of Internet gambling on a theory of aiding and abetting liability
does not directly advance a government interest.266 In its motion to dismiss,
the DOJ argued that the government interest is directly advanced because the
DOJ, by “punishing and deterring” such advertising, is reducing the ability of
gambling Web sites to attract customers.267 In response, Casino City called
this argument “legally insufficient” in light of the holding in Greater New
Orleans that to satisfy this element of the test, the government needs to show
that the harms it recites are real and that the speech restriction will “alleviate
them to a material degree.”268 Casino City argued that the DOJ has evidence
of neither a harm nor alleviation of a speculative harm to a material degree.269
In fact, Web sites not based in the United States are free to carry Internet
261. Id.
262. Gambling attorney Anthony Cabot said the United States is losing about $7 billion per
year by outlawing Internet gambling. Gumbel, supra note 246, at A3.
263. See Watson et al., supra note 10, at 209. “Countries that authorize Internet gambling and
draw financial resources from it have little motivation to enforce U.S. antigambling laws.” Id. at
210.
264. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
265. See Complaint, supra note 21; DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29; Casino City
Response, supra note 34; DOJ Reply, supra note 38.
266. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.
267. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 22.
268. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 25. Casino City stated that “[c]onjecture is all
that the DOJ has to offer” on this prong. Id.
269. Id.
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gambling advertising that will be accessible to Americans. Therefore,
prohibiting online gambling advertising in the United States wouldn’t wholly
deprive Americans of Internet gambling marketing.270 The DOJ responded by
pointing out that reducing advertising for an activity will reduce the prevalence
of the activity itself.271
2.

Analysis

Taking into account the rather limited amount of information contained in
the pleadings about direct advancement of the state interest, the DOJ in a
future case may fail to prove this prong of the Central Hudson test. According
to Edenfield v. Fane, the government’s burden to show material alleviation of a
harm will not be met by “mere speculation or conjecture.”272 In many
commercial speech cases, if the government loses the case, the “direct
advancement” element is the element that the government fails to meet.273 In
Greater New Orleans—a case about broadcast advertising of casinos—the
Supreme Court didn’t fully buy the government’s argument that an advertising
ban would directly advance its substantial interest in reducing the social costs
of gambling. Justice Stevens wrote:
Assuming the accuracy of this causal chain, it does not necessarily follow that
the Government’s speech ban has directly and materially furthered the asserted
interest. While it is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have
some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume
that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino
rather than another.274

Additionally, Stevens pointed out that the effectiveness of the ban must be
considered in light of the fact that the federal government was simultaneously
encouraging tribal casino gambling.275

270. Id. at 25–26 (stating that “[b]anning U.S. portals from carrying Internet gaming
advertisements does little if anything to remove the advertisements from the Internet as foreign
based portals will continue to carry them unabated”).
271. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 13 (“[T]he connection between advertising an activity and
increased incidence of the activity is the very reason that Internet gambling businesses pay Casino
City to advertise for them . . . .”).
272. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
273. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 120–21.
[P]ractically all of the state restrictions on commercial speech which the Supreme Court
has invalidated have been voided not on the ground that the state interest was
insufficiently important or substantial but because the means selected to advance that
interest was not directly related to the governmental interest, even if it were assumed that
the state interest had qualified as a substantial one.
Id.
274. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999).
275. Id.
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Here, it seems difficult to assume that the DOJ crackdown on advertising
subsequent to the NAB letter in 2003 has either stemmed the appetite for
Internet gambling among Americans or materially furthered the government’s
interest in reducing illegal gambling. In fact, it seems that the popularity of
Internet gambling is only growing.276 In 2003, $10 million was spent on
Internet gambling advertising; in 2002, it went from 11th to 5th place in
overall Internet ad impressions.277 PokerRoom.com, which is second in size to
PartyPoker.com, had a 60 percent increase in business in 2004, and 80 percent
of its 2.5 million users are in the United States.278 At cardplayerpoker.com, a
free-play site, “the Internet numbers are doubling every three or four months,
and have been for several years now.”279 BETonSPORTS.com expected to add
50,000 new customers to its existing 1.2 million customers by the end of
2004.280 The publication In Business Las Vegas reported that Internet
gambling operators are “winning the advertising war” by increasing spending
“on everything from sponsorships to the kinds of traditional marketing
campaigns reserved for major product brands.”281 This includes advertising on
cable television, billboards, and sponsoring a Formula One team in Europe and
fighters in the Ultimate Fighting Championship.282 Estimates of Internet
gambling companies’ revenue vary, and it is problematic, given the lack of
regulation or reporting requirements, to get a firm grasp on whether the efforts
276. Kathy Kristoff, Online Gambling Makes It Easy to Lose Shirt, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 10,
2004, at E3 (quoting gambling industry statistician Sebastian Sinclair as saying, “The
fundamental factor that’s driving this industry is demand. . . . And there is tremendous demand
that will make Internet gambling difficult to stop.”).
277. Richard Williamson, Online Casinos Await Answer from DOJ, ADWEEK, Oct. 18, 2004,
at 13.
278. Orr, supra note 252.
279. Poker’s Growing Stakes, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 8, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/4694939. The recent growth in popularity of poker has been attributed both to the Internet and
the cable broadcast of the World Poker Tour. “Poker is seen as a competition and a sport now,
not as gambling per se,” said Mike Sexton, a commentator for the World Poker Tour. Walter
Kirn & Jeffrey Ressner, Hot Game in Town: Poker’s New Face, TIME, July 26, 2004, at 30.
280. Peter John, Betonsports Puts Its Money on Weathering Hurricane Season, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2004, at 23. The company’s new real-time poker site gained 700 new users within its
first four hours of operation. Id. Likewise, Sportingbet, a U.K. company that offers online sports
betting, poker, and casino games to a clientele that is 70 percent American, added 76,000 new
customers in the four-month period ending in July 2004 and will likely have profits of at least £25
million this year. Peter Shearlock, Company Spotlight: One Business Makes the Internet a Really
Safe Bet, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 21, 2004, at 10.
281. Liz Benston, Online Casinos Continue Marketing Push, IN BUS. LAS VEGAS, Dec. 17,
2004, at 15.
282. Id. Online casinos and sports books are also making use of nontraditional marketing. Id.
GoldenPalace.com has tried to insert itself into headlines by paying streakers to run through
sporting events with its name painted on their bodies, and also sponsored a private Canadian team
trying to build a space craft. Eli Kintisch, SpaceShipOne Now Has Eye on the Prize, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2004 at A1.
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of the DOJ have caused Americans to spend less money on gambling.283 But
regardless of whether or not Americans are spending less money on Internet
gambling, the increase in sign-ups at gambling Web sites at least suggests that
more Americans are learning about the sites and checking them out.284 Much
like in Greater New Orleans, the ban on advertising doesn’t seem to directly
advance the DOJ’s interests, because it seems to have done little to reduce the
interest in Internet gambling among Americans. Thus, it seems that the DOJ
has not proven its point, at least according to the pleadings, on this prong of the
Central Hudson test.
D. Prong Four: Restriction Not More Extensive than Necessary
The final prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the government’s
prohibition of commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary to serve
the asserted purpose.285 Again, the pleadings are considerably briefer on this
topic than they are on first two prongs of the Central Hudson test.
1.

Arguments

Casino City’s complaint stated that the threatened application of federal
law against companies that advertise Internet gambling “is not narrowly drawn
to effectuate any purported government interest.”286 The DOJ’s motion to
dismiss argued that its prohibition on Internet gambling advertisements could
not be any more narrowly tailored because it only targeted illegal Internet
gambling that would violate 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute.287
Casino City, in its reply, argued that the DOJ had not provided any evidence
for its contention, and that although Casino City was not required to do so, it
should be given an opportunity to show the court alternative measures that
would achieve the government’s interest less intrusively than the challenged

283. Internet gambling revenue topped $7 billion in 2004. Curbing Internet Gambling,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 6, 2005, at 8. Christian Capital Advisors projects revenue to rise
to $9.8 billion in 2005. Id. By 2018, it predicts yearly revenue of $18.4 billion. Id. “Our
revenues are greater than Yahoo!’s. Our profits are greater than Amazon’s. It’s ridiculous,” said
Alex Czajkowski, marketing director of Sportingbet PLC, a company that had a $39.5 million
operating profit last fiscal year. Lorraine Woellert, Can Online Betting Change Its Luck?, BUS.
WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 66.
284. “At least three factors have lead to the popularity of Internet gambling”: It is anonymous
and does not require travel; it is a low-cost business to run; and the U.S. public generally accepts
gambling. Watson et al., supra note 10, at 209. For the ever-increasing popularity of Web
gambling, especially poker, see Gumbel, supra note 246; American Citizens Want to Gamble on
the Internet, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 67.
285. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
286. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.
287. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 22.
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restriction.288 The DOJ, in response, observed that Casino City did not put
forth any alternatives in its response to the motion to dismiss.289 Without any
suggestions from Casino City about how the government could accomplish its
goal of cutting down on the ability of Internet gambling sites to solicit U.S.
customers, the DOJ argued that its motion to dismiss should be granted.290
2.

Analysis

As previously described, the government is not required to employ the
least restrictive means conceivable; it must, however, make sure that the
speech restriction is reasonably tailored to promote the asserted interest.291 In
44 Liquormart, the Court struck down Rhode Island’s law against publishing
the price of liquor in an advertisement.292 In authoring the majority opinion,
Justice Stevens found that there were other methods to achieve the state’s
objective of promoting temperance that did not involve any restriction on
speech, such as maintenance of high prices through direct regulation or an
increased alcohol tax.293 Similarly, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,294 the
Court decided that the government’s substantial interest in suppressing strength
wars in the beer market did not warrant a ban on beer labels which disclose
alcohol content.295 The majority opinion expressed that there were a variety of
regulatory options available, such as directly limiting the alcohol content of
beer, which did not implicate speech.296
The DOJ seemed to identify the substantial interests here as enforcement
of criminal laws and reducing aid to illegal gambling companies, as well as
reducing gambling by reducing gambling advertising.297 Again, the overall
question of whether Internet sports betting and casino gambling are legal
reared its head. Under the DOJ’s approach, both casino games and betting on
the Web are deemed illegal.298 Therefore, it would seem that the DOJ’s
warning against Internet gambling advertising is not simply one of the least
288. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 26.
289. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 14.
290. Id.
291. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (citing
Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
292. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996).
293. Id. Stevens also suggested that per capita purchases could be limited, such as with
prescription drugs, or the state could promote an anti-drinking message through educational
campaigns. Id.
294. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
295. Id. at 490–91.
296. Id. “[R]espondent suggests several alternatives . . . . We agree that the availability of all
these options, all of which could advance the Government’s asserted interest . . . indicates that
[the law in question] is more extensive than necessary.” Id.
297. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 20.
298. NAB Letter, supra note 11.
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restrictive means available, but possibly one of a very few means available to
prevent Internet gambling operators from offering their services to
Americans.299 To enforce the Wire Act against the Internet gambling industry,
it seems that prosecutors must go after advertisers and payment processing
services.300 Under these conditions, a court could find that a speech restriction
is reasonably tailored to serve the asserted interest.301 However, if a court
views Internet casino gambling as not expressly illegal under federal law—
i.e., that federal law only prohibits Internet sports gambling, via the Wire Act
and the holding in In re MasterCard—restricting advertising about Internet
casino gambling could be less of a reasonable fit. In that scenario, it seems
that the DOJ’s interest in reducing illegal gambling and the social problems
associated with gambling could be achieved by strict regulation of the Internet
gambling industry.302 Such regulation could require casino and betting Web
sites to use identity verification software to keep tabs on who customers are
and how much they are gambling. Thus, a court’s ruling on the fourth prong
may depend on whether it considers both Internet casino gambling and sports
betting to be an illegal activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
If this issue comes before a court again, it is conceivable that a court could
rule that a company like Casino City may advertise Internet casinos but not
Internet sports betting Web sites. Under Fifth Circuit precedent established in
In re MasterCard, the Wire Act forbids taking sports bets via the Internet, but
not offering casino gambling via the Internet.303 Therefore, the company

299. Because many Internet gambling companies are located in offshore jurisdictions, it is
difficult for the United States to enforce its laws against them. “To effectively prohibit Internet
gambling, the U.S. government would have to ensure that these . . . operators do not offer their
services within U.S. borders, a proposition that poses a range of unanswered questions regarding
feasibility.” NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-10. One feasibility problem is that it is easy to
change the address of a Web site, which consists of a chain of numbers, and doing so makes it
difficult to track the physical location of the company using the Web site. Id. at 5-11.
300. “Companies that do business with offshore-based gambling Web sites have been subject
to pressure and prosecution from the U.S. government.” Watson et al., supra note 10, at 210.
PayPal agreed to pay $10 million to settle the DOJ’s claim that it was violating the Wire Act by
facilitating Internet gambling transactions. Id.
301. However, if the Court determines that both casino and sports betting on the Internet are
illegal conduct, under the first prong of Central Hudson, then the government will automatically
have the right to prohibit advertising of them because there is no First Amendment right to
advertise illegal activity. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
302. “[Legalization will allow] strict legislative scrutiny of all provisions and enable
lawmakers to delegate the appropriate authority to those who can enforce the regulations
effectively.” Friedrich, supra note 10, at 370.
303. In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002).
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would not be advertising illegal conduct, under In re MasterCard, if it ran
online casino advertisements. However, the government may still restrict
online casino advertisements if it satisfies the remaining prongs of the Central
Hudson test. Under the Central Hudson test, once the legality of the advertised
conduct has been established, a court must then consider whether the
government has a substantial interest in prohibiting the commercial speech,
whether the government’s restriction materially advances the asserted interest,
and whether the government’s restriction is no more extensive than
necessary.304 The potential social ills associated with Internet gambling, such
as gambling addiction and the opportunity for fraud, probably justify the
DOJ’s substantial interest in restricting Internet gambling advertising.
However, because of the ever-increasing popularity of Internet gambling,
especially Internet poker, and because Internet gambling is still being marketed
to American consumers via methods like sports sponsorships, a court could
find that the DOJ’s restriction has not materially advanced its interest. Lastly,
concerning whether the speech restriction is no more extensive than necessary,
a court’s decision will probably depend on whether it considers online casino
gambling a legal activity. Because Internet gambling operations are based
offshore, though, it is possible that a court could find that the advertising
prohibition is the only method for the DOJ to enforce the government interest
in reduced gambling. Therefore, assuming that a court determines Internet
casino gambling to be lawful and that the government’s restriction does not
materially advance its interest, it is conceivable that a future complainant may
establish the right to advertise Internet casinos.
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